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Expertise and participation

In his discussion of experts and democracy, Peter uses an article by Philip Kitcher to begin asking questions about the role of experts in democracies, particularly with regard to decision making. Kitcher’s review reports the belief that “genuine democratic participation … Continue reading

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Instrumentalism in the Galileo Affair

In his unpublished notes from 1615, commenting on Cardinal Bellarmine’s Letter to Foscarini, the Carmelite Father, Galileo wrote as follows: It is of the highest prudence to believe that there is no demonstration of the mobility of the earth until … Continue reading

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Scientific method and demarcation

In The Scientific Method, Mike Zajko sets out an argument that “no agreed-upon formulation of the scientific method exists” and that “it is more effective to consider science’s methods in terms of Hugh Gauch’s ‘general principles of scientific methodology’”, going … Continue reading

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Doubt and disunity

The question is: when does this incompleteness, coupled with a focus on anomalies for a given theory and an insistence that it may be wrong, become abuse – using our uncertainty to delay or undermine theories rather than developing alternatives? Continue reading

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Concepts and consequences

In Book IV of the Physics, Aristotle explored the concept of place in search of a rigorous understanding. Rejecting the possibilities of shape, matter and “some sort of extension between the bounding surfaces of the containing body” (221b), he arrived … Continue reading

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Feyerabend’s methodological argument for realism

This is a slightly amended discussion of a methodological argument for scientific realism due to Feyerabend, focusing on a difficulty that arose from considering Einstein’s study of Brownian motion and the transition from the phenomenological to kinetic theories of gases. … Continue reading

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Some historiography of witchcraft

Early discussion of witchcraft amongst historians was based on the assumptions that the belief in witches and associated phenomena died out due to the advent of the scientific revolution and that the persecution of witches in the first place occurred … Continue reading

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Philosophy as remedy

This is a revised version of some comments I wrote a few years ago, when I observed that it is increasingly common to read opinion pieces that propose an increase in the study of philosophy, logic and science in schools as … Continue reading

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Cormac McCarthy and free will

In this entry I discuss the work of Cormac McCarthy and the degree to which it is concerned with the freedom of the will. My claim, such as it is, is that some of his works contain an extended examination … Continue reading

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On cranks and demarcation

It is generally acknowledged that attempts to demarcate science from non- or pseudoscience, based on a priori standards, have failed. Here I discuss a values-based approach, advocated by Feyerabend in his paper Realism and Instrumentalism, in which he wrote: The … Continue reading

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