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	<title>Comments for The Kindly Ones</title>
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	<link>http://thekindlyones.org</link>
	<description>Exploring the awful, inalterable solidarity of humanity.</description>
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		<title>Comment on Hegel and the development of Feyerabend&#8217;s thought by Paul Newall</title>
		<link>http://thekindlyones.org/2011/12/19/hegel-and-the-development-of-feyerabends-thought/comment-page-1/#comment-361</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul Newall]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 31 Dec 2011 20:29:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://thekindlyones.org/?p=606#comment-361</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Thanks for the comment. I had in mind that, on Feyerabend&#039;s view, we can argue that any theory in the first sense is relying on a conceptual framework that, since it is not subjected to scepticism, is essentially functioning instrumentally. Indeed, we could potentially employ his &lt;a href=&quot;http://thekindlyones.org/2010/11/02/feyerabends-methodological-argument-for-realism/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;methodological argument for realism&lt;/a&gt; at the conceptual level, which would be interesting if it implies the rejection of conceptual stability.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for the comment. I had in mind that, on Feyerabend&#8217;s view, we can argue that any theory in the first sense is relying on a conceptual framework that, since it is not subjected to scepticism, is essentially functioning instrumentally. Indeed, we could potentially employ his <a href="http://thekindlyones.org/2010/11/02/feyerabends-methodological-argument-for-realism/" rel="nofollow">methodological argument for realism</a> at the conceptual level, which would be interesting if it implies the rejection of conceptual stability.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Hegel and the development of Feyerabend&#8217;s thought by Peter</title>
		<link>http://thekindlyones.org/2011/12/19/hegel-and-the-development-of-feyerabends-thought/comment-page-1/#comment-351</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Dec 2011 22:48:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://thekindlyones.org/?p=606#comment-351</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Interesting take on Feyerabend. When you say &quot;realism in a sense collapses into conceptual instrumentalism&quot;, do you mean that the concept is an instrument for increasing verisimilitude? I&#039;d find it hard to see realism collapsing into practical or technical instrumentalism (so-named here simply to differentiate from &quot;conceptual instrumentalism&quot;) since, as I understand it, instrumentalism normally eschews any claims on realism; it&#039;s more like betting tips than The Truth about the world.
Anyway, the dialectic view of science seems like a third way in contrast to instrumentalist and realist accounts. Rather than good bets or increasing versimilitude, the dialectician seeks to say progressively more interesting (&quot;enriched&quot;) things about the world.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interesting take on Feyerabend. When you say &#8220;realism in a sense collapses into conceptual instrumentalism&#8221;, do you mean that the concept is an instrument for increasing verisimilitude? I&#8217;d find it hard to see realism collapsing into practical or technical instrumentalism (so-named here simply to differentiate from &#8220;conceptual instrumentalism&#8221;) since, as I understand it, instrumentalism normally eschews any claims on realism; it&#8217;s more like betting tips than The Truth about the world.<br />
Anyway, the dialectic view of science seems like a third way in contrast to instrumentalist and realist accounts. Rather than good bets or increasing versimilitude, the dialectician seeks to say progressively more interesting (&#8220;enriched&#8221;) things about the world.</p>
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		<title>Comment on On cranks and demarcation by Hegel and the development of Feyerabend&#8217;s thought &#124; The Kindly Ones</title>
		<link>http://thekindlyones.org/2010/10/18/on-cranks-and-demarcation/comment-page-1/#comment-349</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hegel and the development of Feyerabend&#8217;s thought &#124; The Kindly Ones]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2011 14:09:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://bienveillantes.wordpress.com/?p=4#comment-349</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] for the Specialist that proliferation, which Feyerabend is recommending in these lessons, is supportive of a principle of tenacity. This latter principle provides for the retention of stable concepts and theories, even in the face [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] for the Specialist that proliferation, which Feyerabend is recommending in these lessons, is supportive of a principle of tenacity. This latter principle provides for the retention of stable concepts and theories, even in the face [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on About &#8216;Militant Modern Atheism&#8217; and Religion by Evidence, Beliefs, and &#8216;Wise Blood&#8217; &#124; The Kindly Ones</title>
		<link>http://thekindlyones.org/2011/10/07/about-militant-modern-atheism-and-religion/comment-page-1/#comment-340</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Evidence, Beliefs, and &#8216;Wise Blood&#8217; &#124; The Kindly Ones]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Nov 2011 15:24:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://thekindlyones.org/?p=581#comment-340</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] The Kindly Ones   Exploring the awful, inalterable solidarity of humanity.      Skip to content HomeAboutComments&#160;PolicyContact        &#8592; About &#8216;Militant Modern Atheism&#8217; and&#160;Religion [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] The Kindly Ones   Exploring the awful, inalterable solidarity of humanity.      Skip to content HomeAboutComments&nbsp;PolicyContact        &larr; About &#8216;Militant Modern Atheism&#8217; and&nbsp;Religion [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Revisiting the Cosmological Argument by We Wouldn&#8217;t Be Here Right Now, Being All Postmodern and Ironic; There&#8217;d Be No Civilization &#171; Vanguard of the Academe</title>
		<link>http://thekindlyones.org/2011/04/13/revisiting-the-cosmological-argument/comment-page-1/#comment-339</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[We Wouldn&#8217;t Be Here Right Now, Being All Postmodern and Ironic; There&#8217;d Be No Civilization &#171; Vanguard of the Academe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Nov 2011 05:02:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://thekindlyones.org/?p=408#comment-339</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] (indeed, by definition have no real way of knowing) whether or not the second premise is true. As Stephen Hawking has famously argued, it is completely consistent with the current laws of physics for a universe to spawn apropos of [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] (indeed, by definition have no real way of knowing) whether or not the second premise is true. As Stephen Hawking has famously argued, it is completely consistent with the current laws of physics for a universe to spawn apropos of [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Selves, Subjects, and Reductionism by About &#8216;Militant Modern Atheism&#8217; and Religion &#124; The Kindly Ones</title>
		<link>http://thekindlyones.org/2011/09/09/selves-subjects-and-reductionism/comment-page-1/#comment-312</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[About &#8216;Militant Modern Atheism&#8217; and Religion &#124; The Kindly Ones]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Oct 2011 13:52:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://thekindlyones.org/?p=573#comment-312</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] Abstract: This essay first discusses the non-eliminable shortcomings (or vacuousness) found in the most vociferous versions of contemporary atheism as put forth in Philip Kitcher&#8217;s “Militant Modern Atheism”. The essay then proceeds to the problems which Kitcher&#8217;s preferred secular humanism project would do well to anticipate as a result of the manner in which Kitcher frames the religious perspective. Finally, this essay addresses the very religious sense and experience which Kitcher too quickly dismisses as being useless to any evidential role. (In certain respects, this essay expands on some of the remarks found in this comment.) [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Abstract: This essay first discusses the non-eliminable shortcomings (or vacuousness) found in the most vociferous versions of contemporary atheism as put forth in Philip Kitcher&#8217;s “Militant Modern Atheism”. The essay then proceeds to the problems which Kitcher&#8217;s preferred secular humanism project would do well to anticipate as a result of the manner in which Kitcher frames the religious perspective. Finally, this essay addresses the very religious sense and experience which Kitcher too quickly dismisses as being useless to any evidential role. (In certain respects, this essay expands on some of the remarks found in this comment.) [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Scientific method and demarcation by Toby Simmons</title>
		<link>http://thekindlyones.org/2010/11/12/scientific-method-and-demarcation/comment-page-1/#comment-296</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Toby Simmons]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2011 15:59:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://thekindlyones.org/?p=165#comment-296</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Very nicely put! I enjoyed reading it.
Great blog, by the way. Let me know what you think of mine . . .
http://apieceofcoffee.wordpress.com/
Keep on posting!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Very nicely put! I enjoyed reading it.<br />
Great blog, by the way. Let me know what you think of mine . . .<br />
<a href="http://apieceofcoffee.wordpress.com/" rel="nofollow">http://apieceofcoffee.wordpress.com/</a><br />
Keep on posting!</p>
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		<title>Comment on Selves, Subjects, and Reductionism by Michael S. Pearl</title>
		<link>http://thekindlyones.org/2011/09/09/selves-subjects-and-reductionism/comment-page-1/#comment-287</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael S. Pearl]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 10 Sep 2011 15:27:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://thekindlyones.org/?p=573#comment-287</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[John, first of all, I hope your back problem is a muscle matter rather than a disk. Secondly, even Glen Beck might be accidentally correct about something! And I suspect that when Maritain and Jaspers are right it is less a matter of accident than it is with Beck.

In any event, the Maritain and Jaspers passages were not so much cited against you as they were used to indicate some points which the dialectically charitable physicalist would want to keep in mind when engaging with those who doubt the adequacy of (especially the most reductive forms of) physicalism. Indeed, with charity it would not matter in the least whether Maritain and Jaspers self-described as dualists. In our context here, Jaspers is likely better considered in terms of a concern with whether strict physicalist modes of expression could ever adequately serve the human condition or human &lt;i&gt;being&lt;/i&gt;. Similarly, Maritain&#039;s way of discriminating philosophy and religion, wherein philosophy regards &quot;the relation of intelligence to object&quot; and religion is concerned with &quot;the relation of subject to subject&quot;, also very strongly suggests that ontology would &lt;i&gt;not&lt;/i&gt; have to be the primary focus or even the keystone to understanding.

Perspectivalness so thoroughly affects human subjectivity that it is very highly likely that were any human person to attain a significant (even if asymptotic) objectivity, there would still remain a significant semantic component. This, then, recommends remaining always cognizant of the semantic aspects of all thought.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>John, first of all, I hope your back problem is a muscle matter rather than a disk. Secondly, even Glen Beck might be accidentally correct about something! And I suspect that when Maritain and Jaspers are right it is less a matter of accident than it is with Beck.</p>
<p>In any event, the Maritain and Jaspers passages were not so much cited against you as they were used to indicate some points which the dialectically charitable physicalist would want to keep in mind when engaging with those who doubt the adequacy of (especially the most reductive forms of) physicalism. Indeed, with charity it would not matter in the least whether Maritain and Jaspers self-described as dualists. In our context here, Jaspers is likely better considered in terms of a concern with whether strict physicalist modes of expression could ever adequately serve the human condition or human <i>being</i>. Similarly, Maritain&#8217;s way of discriminating philosophy and religion, wherein philosophy regards &#8220;the relation of intelligence to object&#8221; and religion is concerned with &#8220;the relation of subject to subject&#8221;, also very strongly suggests that ontology would <i>not</i> have to be the primary focus or even the keystone to understanding.</p>
<p>Perspectivalness so thoroughly affects human subjectivity that it is very highly likely that were any human person to attain a significant (even if asymptotic) objectivity, there would still remain a significant semantic component. This, then, recommends remaining always cognizant of the semantic aspects of all thought.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Selves, Subjects, and Reductionism by John S. Wilkins</title>
		<link>http://thekindlyones.org/2011/09/09/selves-subjects-and-reductionism/comment-page-1/#comment-286</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[John S. Wilkins]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 10 Sep 2011 07:09:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://thekindlyones.org/?p=573#comment-286</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I appreciate that your have fairly represented my views. Citing two well known dualists – Maritain and Jaspers - against me is like citing Glen Beck as a reason not to vote for Barack Obama&#039;s jobs package, however.

One point: no, I did not argue for my view that there is no unitary and ontologically distinct self. That was my starting point for the rant (inspired by some feelings of back pain and subsequent analgesics), not the conclusion for it. But I wanted to get a debate going, and it seems I did. However, I have argued for this before, and many others have done so for a long time.

When I studied the pre-Hellenic Hebrews, in particular the eighth century prophets, I was shocked to discover that they were largely physicalists; no immaterial souls for them. Just recently I read Isidore of Seville&#039;s &lt;i&gt;Etymologiae&lt;/i&gt; and he, too, while he has an immaterial soul, experience and consciousness (mind) is about &quot;deliberation&quot; and memory rather than experiences.

It seems to me that one could be a Christian physicalist about everything except God. Of course, that does not sit well in the Augustinian and Athanasian tradition.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I appreciate that your have fairly represented my views. Citing two well known dualists – Maritain and Jaspers &#8211; against me is like citing Glen Beck as a reason not to vote for Barack Obama&#8217;s jobs package, however.</p>
<p>One point: no, I did not argue for my view that there is no unitary and ontologically distinct self. That was my starting point for the rant (inspired by some feelings of back pain and subsequent analgesics), not the conclusion for it. But I wanted to get a debate going, and it seems I did. However, I have argued for this before, and many others have done so for a long time.</p>
<p>When I studied the pre-Hellenic Hebrews, in particular the eighth century prophets, I was shocked to discover that they were largely physicalists; no immaterial souls for them. Just recently I read Isidore of Seville&#8217;s <i>Etymologiae</i> and he, too, while he has an immaterial soul, experience and consciousness (mind) is about &#8220;deliberation&#8221; and memory rather than experiences.</p>
<p>It seems to me that one could be a Christian physicalist about everything except God. Of course, that does not sit well in the Augustinian and Athanasian tradition.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Feyerabend and historiographic proliferation by Philosophy of science nerd-fest &#171; Praj&#039;s Blog</title>
		<link>http://thekindlyones.org/2011/08/28/feyerabend-and-historiographic-proliferation/comment-page-1/#comment-285</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Philosophy of science nerd-fest &#171; Praj&#039;s Blog]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 10 Sep 2011 02:50:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://thekindlyones.org/?p=526#comment-285</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[...] first turn to Paul Newall&#8217;s keen observation that Feyerband&#8217;s historical approach to understanding the progress of science itself violates [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] first turn to Paul Newall&#8217;s keen observation that Feyerband&#8217;s historical approach to understanding the progress of science itself violates [...]</p>
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