On Lutz on Laudan and demarcation

In his (draft) paper On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Demarcation Criteria of Science, Sebastian Lutz claims that demarcation does not require a criterion that is both a necessary and sufficient condition, as had been discussed in Laudan’s famous paper The demise of the demarcation problem. In a succinct counterargument, Lutz explains that we might have a sufficient condition allowing us to say that something is scientific and a distinct necessary condition allowing us to say that something else is not scientific; in short, that “Laudan’s demand that [the necessary and sufficient criteria] be one and the same is supererogatory”. Lutz goes on to propose that Laudan’s admission that most candidates for necessary criteria are implausible implies that some are not, and furthermore that Laudan’s comments suggest that, since we have an ordinary use sense of the demarcation between science and non-science, there must also be a plausible sufficient condition. Consequently, there may be a necessary condition and a separate sufficient condition for demarcating scientific theories.

I want to defend Laudan’s paper on several grounds. Firstly, it does not follow from our everyday use of demarcation that a philosophically rigorous sufficient criterion exists. Although we might, as Lutz posits, try to enumerate what we ordinarily call science, it is precisely this attempt that – along with the search for a necessary criterion – has failed. When Lutz argues that this ordinary criterion, although possibly very weak, can “already decide important cases”, the implication is that our ordinary use of the term science is enough to work with and build upon; but Laudan’s requirement of the enumeration is that it should be an “adequate explication” and “must exhibit epistemically significant differences”. We therefore need to show why our ordinary use provides a sufficient condition that will survive philosophical scrutiny, rather than starting from it.

Moreover, and on the other hand, if this ordinary use suggests that we have some kind of sufficient criterion, we should also be fair to Laudan’s invocation of it and note that our typical understanding of demarcation involves a criterion that is both necessary and sufficient. Lutz’s criticism is perhaps slightly uncharitable insofar as Laudan explicitly discusses a demarcation criterion that we assume will do the work of identifying both what is and what is not science. This captures our ordinary use of demarcation as a means of division rather than determining that something is x while separately determining that something else is not-y; that is, building upon our ordinary use. After all, this is what we see in examples like verification and falsification: the criterion is intended to demarcate for us on its own. This does not mean we should limit ourselves to seeking a single criterion but only that if we are going to begin with ordinary use then we should be consistent.

Secondly, Laudan does not claim that separate conditions can never be found because he does not need to. Indeed, this early part of Laudan’s paper is preparatory work: he reviews demarcation traditions, arguing that they have failed, but the discovery of a successful demarcation criterion would not imperil his main argument, which is not that the demarcation criteria so far identified have failed or that successful criteria can never be found but rather that demarcation is superfluous and beside the point.

I have explained this previously but demarcation’s demise is thus not due to the lack of a philosophically rigorous demarcation criterion but instead because it turns out that, for Laudan at least, demarcation is unhelpful and unnecessary. Much like the objection I made to the invoking of parsimony as a methodological rule, the merits or otherwise of an idea only become apparent after we have investigated it. Even those that seem straightforwardly to be hopeless may subsequently prove to have something to recommend them and we are extremely unlikely to discover this if we reject them ab initio. Note that this does not imply that all ideas will have such merits in due course, or that we should set aside time, money and other resources to conduct the investigation. If advocates of an idea wish to see it succeed, it is for them to pursue it and, when a case can be made, to present it in a stronger form.

For Laudan, this investigation would result in our being able to say whether or not the idea turned out to be well-founded and well-confirmed, but it could also be that philosophical examination provides additional criticisms or supporting arguments. Whatever the case, the idea or the theory it becomes is ultimately assessed based on how it survives this period of scrutiny. There is no need to pre-judge this process via demarcation because that removes or hinders the possibility that what seems like a bad idea might turn out to be useful or successful. Although this may sometimes be unpalatable if we want to give a final answer on ideas we dislike or have reasons to associate with ulterior motives, it is this openness that allowed science to develop and for some originally discredited theories to eventually prove their worth.

If it were the case that we have or could one day find a necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion, or if we could identify separate criteria as Lutz suggests, Laudan’s argument in The demise of the demarcation problem would not be threatened because, as he says in closing his paper, the status of claims is irrelevant; what really matters is their credentials. We should perhaps be careful not to put the cart before the horse: it is because an idea seems to have little to recommend it that we reject it, rather than seeking to reject or accept it from the outset. Although it is tempting to try to shortcut this process, science might turn out to be the poorer for it or, if this view had been applied in the past, not have developed at all.

References:

Laudan, L. (1983) The demise of the demarcation problem, in R. S. Cohen & L. Laudan (Eds.), Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis (pp. 111–127). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Lutz, S. (2011) On an Allegedly Essential Feature of Demarcation Criteria of Science [Draft]. PhilSci Archive, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8609/.

This entry was posted in Philosophy of Science and tagged , . Bookmark the permalink.

15 Responses to On Lutz on Laudan and demarcation

  1. zammael says:

    Awesome demolition ot Lutz’s misleading response. How odd that a so called scholar of philosophy completely whiffs on the argument he’s supposedly attacking. Another demarcationist bites the dust, thanks to your concise BS meter.

  2. Paul’s summary of my short note leaves out its core point: I argue that Laudan’s argument that every criterion has to be both necessary and sufficient is not sound (I am not arguing that the conclusion is false, and certainly not arguing that there is a demarcation criterion). In short, Laudan (1983, 119) claims that “[w]ithout conditions which are both necessary and sufficient, we are never in a position to say ‘this is scientific: but that is unscientific’.” Since we need to say that sometimes (eg. when saying that creationism is not a science, but evolutionary theory is), he concludes, a criterion has to give a condition that is both necessary and sufficient. But the quoted claim is (quite obviously, it seems to me) incorrect: If I have a necessary condition for being a science that, say, creationism does not fulfill, and a different sufficient condition that, say, evolutionary theory fulfills, then I can infer that evolutionary theory is a science while creationism is not.

    The remaining part of the note is only about what is suggested (not entailed) by Laudan’s further remarks. And Laudan’s remark that our ordinary way of partitioning science from non-science places restrictions on possible demarcation criteria suggests that every demarcation criterion has to declare some things scientific (presumably those that are declared science by all our ordinary ways of partitioning), which gives a sufficient criterion: All those things that have to be declared scientific are scientific. An important point here is that this is not my own position, but rather a position entailed by Laudan’s demand with respect to ordinary ways of partitioning. (I am, in fact, at least opposed to the idea that ordinary language should restrict concept formation.)

    @zammael: As mentioned, I did not claim that there is a demarcation criterion, only that one specific argument for an allegedly essential feature of such criteria is not sound. Accordingly, everything after Paul’s third paragraph may be true, but since he argues for the claim that a demarcation criterion is irrelevant, this is not connected to the point in my paper.

    • Sebastian, in your above comment, you say “Laudan’s argument [is] that every criterion has to be both necessary and sufficient”, but that has not been my understanding of what Laudan says.

      Laudan wrote, “Ideally, [the formal structure of a demarcation criterion] would specify a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions”. Accordingly, Laudan is talking about a single successful demarcation criterion comprised of any number of necessary conditions where the necessary conditions when taken jointly effect a sufficient demarcation. This is how I have understood Laudan’s claim, and such a claim seems wholly unobjectionable. After all, necessary conditions do not always effect a sufficient condition either alone or in each and every combination, and it does not seem that a formally sufficient condition can obtain absent a set of relevant necessary conditions. Hence, Laudan’s conjoining of necessary and sufficient appears absolutely proper and correct.

      Each such necessary condition might just as well be referred to as a necessary criterion, but Laudan does not refer to these individual conditions as having to be individually necessary and sufficient. If each Laudan “condition” were referred to as a “criterion”, it would still not be the case that Laudan were claiming that each such necessary criterion also “has to be … sufficient”.

      Even if a successfully sufficient demarcation were attainable, it might well be that it were not applicable in all contexts. In that case, there could be multiple demarcation criteria, but it would also be utterly unobjectionable to expect that each such sufficient criterion would be comprised of necessary conditions taken jointly. In essence, this would be to say that, regardless of the particulars, each successful demarcation will be sufficient owing to necessary conditions having been satisfied. In other words, in formal rather than informal terms, demarcation requires necessary conditions which when taken jointly effect a sufficient condition or criterion.

      This then leaves us to consider the nature of more informal demarcation, but I will await your response/clarification/correction-of-my-understanding before I go into that.

    • zammael says:

      Lutz, I understand that your paper was only two pages long but I don’t think you were fair to Laudan.

      Basically demarcation has been and continues to be used as “machine de guerre” in arguments between scientists and those outside of the community (non-scientists or pseudo-scientists). That is why I agree with Laudan that we should move on from demarcation to terms like reliable and unreliable knowledge, and forget all about whether it is “scientific” or not. Let rhetoricians weasel about with demarcation criteria, and let us move on to more relevant issues.

  3. Michael, a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions amount to one necessary and sufficient condition (by conjunction). When I speak of each criterion having to provide a necessary and sufficient condition, I am referring to that
    conjunction. As I write in the short note, Laudan makes an argument that nothing short of a necessary and sufficient condition is an acceptable criterion, and it is that argument that I criticize. Maybe there is a sound argument for Laudan’s claim, but Laudan’s argument is not sound.

    • a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions amount to one necessary and sufficient condition (by conjunction). When I speak of each criterion having to provide a necessary and sufficient condition, I am referring to that conjunction. … Laudan makes an argument that nothing short of a necessary and sufficient condition is an acceptable criterion, and it is that argument that I criticize. Maybe there is a sound argument for Laudan’s claim, but Laudan’s argument is not sound.

      Sebastian, in your draft you say: “To be able to say that a is scientific … while b is not … all that is needed is one sufficient condition … that is fulfilled by a … and one necessary condition … that is not fulfilled by b …”.

      If “a is scientific” it is because a “sufficient condition … is fulfilled by a“, and if that sufficiency criterion is the conjunction of individually necessary conditions, then you seem to be agreeing with Laudan. Then again, maybe the sufficient condition in your draft is not supposed to be understood as being comprised of necessary conditions.

      I can certainly see how, particularly in a more informal presentation, there might be allegedly sufficient conditions which might not depend on necessary conditions, but it is not immediately apparent to me how a sufficient condition without constitutive necessary conditions would be expected to apply to the matter concerned with defining science and/or demarcation.

      I hope you do not mind this “baby steps” approach to analyzing your presentation, but I have to be sure I am understanding you properly before I continue. After all, if I am not understanding you correctly, then that would very likely affect my thinking about other points which you discuss.

      • Michael, not every sufficient condition has to be a conjunction of individually necessary conditions (otherwise, all sufficient conditions would also be necessary). And it would beg the question to simply assume that in the case of a demarcation criterion, each sufficient condition must be such a conjunction.

  4. not every sufficient condition has to be a conjunction of individually necessary conditions (otherwise, all sufficient conditions would also be necessary). And it would beg the question to simply assume that in the case of a demarcation criterion, each sufficient condition must be such a conjunction.

    Let me try a different tack to see if this might better express my perspective on this matter.

    As noted previously, you have said, “To be able to say that a is scientific … while b is not … all that is needed is one sufficient condition … that is fulfilled by a … and one necessary condition … that is not fulfilled by b …”.

    It is possible for the sufficiency condition to be the conjunction of individually necessary conditions. In that case, b can be non-scientific by virtue of not fulfilling a necessary condition. This, of course, would put you in perfect agreement with Laudan.

    Alternatively, it is possible that the sufficiency condition is not dependent on necessary conditions. In that case, the fact that b does not fulfill “one necessary condition” in no way establishes that b is not scientific, since all that is relevant to scientific standing is whether a sufficient condition is satisfied. It may be that b does not fulfill any sufficient condition, but then b is non-scientific simply because it does not fulfill a sufficient condition, and the non-scientific status of b is in no way determined by the fact that b does not fulfill some necessary condition — necessary conditions being wholly besides the point since scientific status is claimed to be a matter of only fulfilling a sufficient condition.

    So, within a context for which the sufficiency condition is not dependent on necessary conditions, the question is whether b is sufficient or not. If you are saying that b is not sufficient, and if sufficiency is not dependent on necessary conditions, then what you should have said is that b is not scientific because it does not fulfill a sufficient condition.

    Under this circumstance, the failure of b to fulfill a necessary condition is not sufficient to establish that b is non-scientific. After all, for all we know based on what you put forth, it may well be that a also does not fulfill a necessary condition and is, nonetheless, scientific. If b is going to be said to be non-scientific owing to its failure to fulfill a necessary condition, then it reasonable to expect that a does fulfill that necessary condition; otherwise, no relevant contrast between a and b has been established. However, once a gets described in terms of having satisfied the necessary condition which b fails to fulfill, then you are back to describing the scientific status is the same way that Laudan does.

    The problem is that you have put no chink in Laudan’s argument until you put forth (and argue for) a sufficient condition for science which has no need of any necessary condition. Laudan presents a (largely historical) context in support of his position which finds that neither sufficient conditions alone nor necessary conditions alone have been adequate for deriving an objective or formulaic criterion for always being able to determine and distinguish that which is scientific and that which is non-scientific. Laudan is not arguing that there is no such thing as a sufficient condition absent constitutive necessary conditions; accordingly, your critique of Laudan cannot be fair and accurate if you disregard the context or do not present an alternative historical reading that provides an alternative context. Even then the issue will still pertain to whether, in the new context you would present, a formal (and objective) criterion can be established or whether an informal (and still significantly subjective) criterion is all that remains available. Laudan’s ultimate point, of course, is that science does not need a formal, an objective demarcation criterion.

    Does this make my point any clearer?

    • Michael, you write

      It is possible for the sufficiency condition to be the conjunction of individually necessary conditions. In that case, b can be non-scientific by virtue of not fulfilling a necessary condition. This, of course, would put you in perfect agreement with Laudan.

      This is correct. And I have only pointed out that Laudan’s argument for the claim that a demarcation criterion has to provide a sufficient condition of this sort is not sound. I have never suggested that the claim is incorrect.

      You further write:

      Alternatively, it is possible that the sufficiency condition is not dependent on necessary conditions. In that case, the fact that b does not fulfill “one necessary condition” in no way establishes that b is not scientific, since all that is relevant to scientific standing is whether a sufficient condition is satisfied.

      This is false, for if there is a necessary condition for being scientific, and b does not fulfill that condition, then b is not scientific. Otherwise, the condition cannot be necessary. (By the way, I take it that by ‘dependent on’ you mean ‘a conjunction of’. Am I mistaken in this?) For the same reason, the following is false:

      Under this circumstance, the failure of b to fulfill a necessary condition is not sufficient to establish that b is non-scientific. After all, for all we know based on what you put forth, it may well be that a also does not fulfill a necessary condition and is, nonetheless, scientific.

      You further write that it

      may be that b does not fulfill any sufficient condition, but then b is non-scientific simply because it does not fulfill a sufficient condition[.]

      But this is, as far as I can tell, the fallacy of denying the antecedent.

      Given that much apparent disagreement between the two of us, I’m wondering whether we are just using the terms ‘sufficient condition’ and ‘necessary condition’ differently. I’m basically using the definition as given on Wikipedia, although note that (as seen in the paper) I am relying on a quantified version of it.

      A short remark on your point that

      Laudan presents a (largely historical) context in support of his position which finds that neither sufficient conditions alone nor necessary conditions alone have been adequate for deriving an objective or formulaic criterion for always being able to determine and distinguish that which is scientific and that which is non-scientific.

      I think that this is not what Lauda does. He argues that the most important criteria suggested so far are either not sufficient or not necessary. His argument that they have to be both is not historical, but just as I have described it in the paper. And this argument is not sound.

      • Michael S. Pearl says:

        Sebastian, as I now understand it, in your draft you are using the very same sufficient criterion that Laudan uses – a sufficient criterion which is the conjunction of individually necessary conditions. You are also saying that in your draft you “have only pointed out that Laudan’s argument for the claim that a demarcation criterion has to provide a sufficient condition of this sort is not sound.”

        I will address the soundness issue presently, but first I should point out that in your draft you actually say that “Laudan’s claim is false.” Throughout your comments here you have repeatedly claimed that Laudan’s argument is not sound, but, as your comments make clear, you are aware that being unsound does not necessarily mean being false; therefore, you may want to reconsider the part of your draft where you say that the Laudan claim is false.

        With regards to the (un)soundness of Laudan’s argument, I fail to see how your statement, “To be able to say that a is scientific … while b is not … all that is needed is one sufficient condition … that is fulfilled by a … and one necessary condition … that is not fulfilled by b …”, demonstrates the unsoundness of Laudan’s argument. As I have said previously, given that your sufficient condition is Laudan’s conjunction of individually necessary conditions, your “b” example amounts to nothing other than a reiteration of the need that some necessary condition(s) be fulfilled in order for the sufficient condition to obtain.

        Still, even putting that aside, it is not at all apparent that Laudan’s point about the individually necessary conditions jointly effecting a sufficient criterion is intended as being assuredly and inescapably true. After all, Laudan does say on page 124: “I will not pretend to be able to prove that there is no conceivable philosophical reconstruction of our intuitive distinction between the scientific and the non-scientific.”

        The “conditions which are both necessary and sufficient” only seem to follow as a possible way out of the thus far failed attempts to demarcate science on the basis of either necessary conditions alone or sufficient conditions alone.

        The bottom line at this point is that if Laudan is not claiming that it is true that science demarcation only succeeds with “conditions which are both necessary and sufficient”, then there seems to be little point in trumpeting an assessment of unsoundness which Laudan could well acknowledge without at all weakening or detracting from his main point that neither a demarcation criterion nor demarcation criteria are essential either to science or to our judgments about purportedly scientific claims.

  5. Michael, in my draft I am not assuming that for demarcation criteria, every sufficient condition is a conjunction of necessary conditions (for then I would assume that for demarcation criteria, every condition has to be both necessary and sufficient, which I argue has not been shown).

    Regarding the sentence ““Laudan’s claim is false”: The claim that I am referring to is

    Without conditions which are both necessary and sufficient, we are never in
    a position to say ‘this is scientific: but that is unscientific’. (Laudan:1983, 119)

    But that is not the conclusion of Laudan’s argument (which is that every demarcation criterion has to provide a necessary and sufficient condition), but one of the premises. And if one of the premises of an argument is false, the argument is not sound.

    You write that

    it is not at all apparent that Laudan’s point about the individually necessary conditions jointly effecting a sufficient criterion is intended as being assuredly and inescapably true. After all, Laudan does say on page 124: “I will not pretend to be able to prove that there is no conceivable philosophical reconstruction of our intuitive distinction between the scientific and the non-scientific.”

    Laudan writes that after arguing that none of a number of proposed criteria provides a condition for being scientific that is both necessary and sufficient. Thus, he claims that, while none of the proposals so far fulfill his demands on a demarcation criterion (which include the demand that it provide a necessary and sufficient condition), there could possibly some proposal in the future that does. Therefore his disclaimer about the inability to prove the impossibility of a demarcation criterion does not mean that he thinks that his demand for a necessary and sufficient condition may be false.

    Regarding your last paragraph: If Laudan indeed claimed that a criterion does not have to provide a necessary and sufficient condition, then his statement that “it seems unlikely” that “something less ambitious” than “a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions” for science “would do the job” (118, sorry for assembling that sentence so awkwardly) would be very puzzling indeed. But if he did, the philosophers I cite in the beginning of the draft as objecting to Laudan’s demand could rejoice: Not only would Laudan not provide a sound argument for this statement, he would even think that it is false.

    • Michael S. Pearl says:

      in my draft I am not assuming that for demarcation criteria, every sufficient condition is a conjunction of necessary conditions (for then I would assume that for demarcation criteria, every condition has to be both necessary and sufficient, which I argue has not been shown).

      Sebastian, it is absolutely legitimate to assume the truth of a matter even when the truth has not been established. In fact, such assumptions are often essential to avoid question begging.

      As for demarcation criteria, it is not at all apparent what you have in mind with regards to sufficient conditions. So, we need to backtrack to the comment found here.

      You agreed that it is possible for the sufficiency condition to be the conjunction of individually necessary conditions. In that case, your b example would be non-scientific by virtue of not fulfilling a necessary condition. You also agree that if this is the sort of sufficient condition which you are using, then your b example puts you in perfect agreement with Laudan.

      I then put forth an alternative for the sufficiency condition, because you argue as if there is an alternative to Laudan’s although you never indicate what would be that sufficient condition. The alternative I put forth is one in which the sufficiency is not a matter of satisfying or following from necessary conditions while also not itself being a necessary condition. In effect, what I was saying is that if the sufficient condition which your a example fulfills is the type of sufficient condition which itself need not be necessary, then your b example ends up being useless, since necessary conditions would be utterly irrelevant to the sufficiency matter which is being presumed as establishing the determination as scientific or not.

      This alternative was not put forth with the expectation that this is the sort of sufficient condition you have in mind for demarcation. Instead, this alternative was put forth in order to reveal that a return to consideration in terms of some sort of sufficient-necessary combination must be done if any poignancy is to be preserved for your b example. Something else which must be kept in mind is that, in order to put you in opposition to Laudan rather than in agreement with him, this sufficient-necessary combination must be something other than the one in which the sufficiency condition is attained with the conjunction of individually necessary conditions.

      Your Wikipedia reference talks a bit about necessary and sufficient conditions, but that explication does not exclude situations wherein “several necessary conditions which, taken together, constitute a sufficient condition”. As your reference notes, the necessary-sufficient combination amounts to/describes an if-and-only-if situation, and this means that the only way for you not to be in agreement with Laudan is if it is your position that demarcation is not an if-and-only-if matter.

      Actually, even that would not be sufficient to put you in opposition to Laudan, because what Laudan actually says is: “Ideally, [the formal structure of a demarcation criterion] would specify [an if-and-only-if condition] for deciding whether an activity or set of statements is scientific or unscientific.” The reason why this is the ideal is because it demands the greatest precision, and it is that sort of precision which is necessary to establish a purely and genuinely objective demarcation. With lesser precision, there results a penumbra with a fuzziness that increases as the precision decreases.

      Do you disagree with (this reading of) Laudan on this point?

      You might say that we have no need of such precision in order to demarcate. But, then, that is only to say that it need not be a matter of actual objectivity to distinguish science from non-science. We certainly do not need such objectivity, but then all that we are left with are our judgments instead of a demarcation which is independent of subjective activity, and, once again, we are right back to being arguably more in agreement with Laudan than with his opponents.

      But, let us get back to your argument against Laudan. And let us pretend that the if-and-only-if condition does not provide the greatest possible objectivity or the most precise definition. In other words, let us make believe that none of Laudan’s opponents ever need – for the sake of sound, thorough, and honest argument – to consider or admit to a distinction between demarcation and judgment.

      You say that the following statement by Laudan is a false premise:

      Without conditions which are both necessary and sufficient, we are never in a position to say ‘this is scientific: but that is unscientific’.

      And you say that you have demonstrated that the premise is false by virtue of your a-sufficient, b-necessary example. However, as per the above discussion, your a-sufficient example has to be an if-and-only-if condition, and then you are reiterating Laudan’s point rather than falsifying it.

      I have more to say about this — especially about common misunderstandings (to put it charitably) regarding what Laudan says, and I think some of that misunderstanding is evident in your draft and in your comments in this discussion. However, before getting into all that, I will wait to see where you think my thinking is either in error or in need of improved explication.

      • Michael, a few short notes on your last post.
        1. I am really, really not assuming that the sufficient condition is a conjunction of necessary ones. Thus it is irrelevant that if I did assume that, I would be in agreement with Laudan.
        2. I have as much in mind for sufficient conditions as I have for necessary conditions: Only their formal relations to ‘being scientific’. If something is a science only if it fulfills condition A, A is a necessary condition, and if something is a science if it fulfills condition B, B is a sufficient condition.
        3. A sufficient condition that is not also necessary cannot determine that something is not a science. It can only determine that something is a science. This is, by the way, what Laudan says as well (pp. 118f).
        4. I agree that with a sufficient and a different necessary condition, there can be unclear cases, unlike with one necessary and sufficient condition.
        5. Having a criterion with one sufficient and one different necessary condition does not mean that demarcation is subjective. For all those things that don’t fulfill the necessary condition, and for all those things that fulfill the sufficient condition, the criterion delivers a clear verdict, just as a necessary and sufficient condition would. For the unclear cases, there is, of course, no clear verdict.
        6. I am really, really not assuming that the sufficient condition has to be an if-and-only-if condition (that is, also necessary).

        Since this thread has taken up too much time already, this will be my last post. Please excuse me bowing out of the discussion so gracelessly; but I can at least let you have the last word.

      • Michael S. Pearl says:

        This comment can now be read here.

  6. Pingback: More on Lutz, Laudan, and Demarcation | The Kindly Ones

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s